A report, claiming a faction of Boko Haram still holds “territories” within Nigeria, grabbed sensational headlines as usual. But the report itself, even discounting its summary dismissal by the military authorities, would appear not as sweeping as the headlines suggested.
Claimed the Reuters report: “A map produced by the US development agency in February and seen by Reuters shows how ISWA [Islamic State of West Africa] territory extends more than 100 miles into the north-eastern Nigerian states of Borno and Yobe, where government has in many areas all but vanished after a decade of conflict.”
If there was indeed a map of occupied territories, shouldn’t the report have highlighted specific locations: villages and hamlets in these “territories,” even if there are no big towns, since these border areas are mainly rural? That casts a haze on the report.
Still, Reuters declared, quoting local sources: “The Islamists have not been defeated as Nigeria says, and researchers say ISWA, less extreme than Boko Haram, has evolved into the dominant group. The US map paints a similar picture, with ISWA operating “in much of Borno.” Again, without specific names of areas, what does “much of Borno” mean?
The report continued, in part quoted, in part verbatim:”It added that there were occasions when ISWA protected residents from Boko Haram fighters, quoting a local herder, whose identity was protected, as saying: ‘If you are a herder, they won’t touch you — just follow their rules and regulations governing the territory. They don’t touch civilians, just security personnel.’”
It also claimed ISWA boasts between 3, 000 and 5, 000 fighters, reportedly “about double Boko Haram’s strength”; and that it operates “within some North-Central and South-South states, including Kogi, Edo and Benue.”
Again, some haze here. Edo is about the only South-South state that has a sizable Muslim population. It’s closeness to Kogi and Benue, with their Christian-Muslim population, could lend credence to an Islamist body operating — or even thriving –there. But which other South-South state bears this demographics — Rivers, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa or Cross River? So, how do “South-South states” fit into this mix, again without specific names of towns and areas?
The hideous violence in Benue, if you go beyond its easy and hysteric attribution to “Fulani herdsmen,” could explain a probable presence of ISWA there. But the same Reuters report claims ISWA is much less violent than Boko Haram, from which fighters it allegedly protects the brood in its territory.
Such a benign profile doesn’t again fit into the killing spree in Benue, and to a little extent, Kogi and Nasarawa. So, if there is high violence in these areas, with little or no report of benign Islamic indoctrination (the exact opposite of Reuters’ profile of ISWA), where then specifically are the “territories” where ISWA operates?
There would appear a huge hole in this Reuters report; and its grabbing of media headlines would appear more sensational than logical. That perhaps may be due to the perennial military-media mutual distrust.
The local media accuses the military — indeed the highest hierarchy of government — of making key policy statements on foreign soil. The military accuses the media of believing the worst of its country, and giving such, undeserving headline and air plays. Both crucial arms of nation-building ought to come to some detente.
Still, while the Reuters’ report would appear a red herring on the security front, flared by a sensational media, it is serious food for thought for the Federal Government: the real anti-terror war starts after the de-escalation on the military front.
Final success would be achieved on the de-radicalisation front, fired by a policy that ensures steady material progress, which births hope, leads to sustainable development and eventual prosperity. These, and only these, would act as doughty counter-foil to doomsday theories, fired by extreme hopelessness, on which the Islamists Boko Haram thrives.
There then is the government’s new challenge, given Reuters‘ profile of ISWA and its operations.
There is no doubt, if one were to be fair, that the Buhari Presidency has far bloodied Boko Haram, from those mad days under President Goodluck Jonathan, when the crazed Islamists not only controlled territories, captured towns and even changed the towns’ names to some exotic Islamic names. All that has stopped. Even this Reuters report, as this editorial’s earlier analysis has shown, hasn’t conclusively proved any Islamists, Boko Haram or offshoots, controls “territories” anymore. The present government deserves commendations for its achievements so far. But that doesn’t translate into “defeating” Boko Haram.
Yes, insurgency is no conventional war, where you have a front on which the opposing armies are arrayed. It is rather a fluid and treacherous hit-and-run operation, in which the society’s poorest and most vulnerable are most often the victims. So, given the Reuters’ report, it’s not enough for the military to summarily dismiss that claim with utmost contempt as it did; or for the Presidency to just re-emphasise no Islamists hold territories in the country; or even President Muhammadu Buhari to speak, tongue-in-cheek, that he read such claims in the papers, but that the Islamists were nowhere outside Sambisa Forest, but only because of its vastness.
But as it is getting clear to everyone now, victory in the battlefield is only a starting point for the final routing. So, no matter how successful the army has been on this account, it is no final victory, however much Nigerians appreciate the bravery and success of the troops.
Therefore, the government should take this Reuters claim as strategic intelligence to forge an effective blueprint for the final defeat of Boko Haram and allied Islamists. That policy would seek to defang Boko Haram’s toxic indoctrination of its victim population. If ISWA controls even a quarter of the “territories” Reuters claims, then the government has its job clearly cut out. It needs an effective charter to de-radicalise, as benign Islamism could pose even greater long-term danger, in the post-Boko Haram era. In this crucial period, acute intelligence gathering is key. Sadly, intelligence appears not the security agencies’ greatest strength right now. They should work extra hard on that front.
