Nigeria’s war against terrorism faces another challenge following its inclusion on the United States’ 2026 Child Soldiers Prevention Act blacklist. The designation raises legitimate questions about the recruitment and use of children by armed groups linked to the Nigerian state. But it also demands a critical distinction: Nigeria must answer for its own failures, not automatically bear the blame for every atrocity committed by terrorists it is fighting.
The US has a legitimate interest in preventing the recruitment and exploitation of children in armed conflict. No government receiving American military assistance should be permitted to recruit children into its armed forces or support armed groups that do so. Yet, the application of this principle must be guided by evidence, a clear understanding of responsibility and a proportionate response.
Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province have terrorised communities for more than 17 years, abducting children and exploiting them as fighters, scouts, spies, messengers, porters and cooks. Girls have faced forced marriage and sexual violence, while children have been used in suicide attacks. These are among the most despicable manifestations of the insurgency.
Recent footage reportedly showing children carrying assault rifles in terrorist hideouts has renewed public concern. In another video, a teenage captive reportedly told troops that he had been paid nearly N1 million to procure food for fighters in the bush. Such accounts expose the human cost of an insurgency that has robbed thousands of children of their childhood, education and freedom.
The March 16 suicide bombings in Maiduguri, which reportedly killed at least 23 people and injured more than 108, further illustrate the brutality of the terrorist threat. The victims were civilians whose lives were shattered by an enemy that recognises neither the sanctity of human life nor the rights of children.
Yet Nigeria’s inclusion on the American blacklist cannot be explained solely by the activities of Boko Haram and ISWAP.
The US Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, particularly Section 404, codified at 22 U.S.C. 2370c-1, targets governments whose armed forces, police, other security forces or government-supported armed groups recruit or use child soldiers.
Under Section 402, codified at 22 U.S.C. 2370c, the definition includes children under 18 used in hostilities by non-state armed groups, as well as children serving in certain support roles.
The law does not simply blacklist every country where terrorists recruit children. It focuses on recruitment or the use by government forces and government-supported armed groups.
Consequently, the question for Nigeria is not merely whether child soldiers exist within its borders, but what evidence links the conduct in question to its security forces or groups it supports.
There is historical context Nigeria must confront. According to the Stimson Center’s Child Soldiers Prevention Act implementation tracker, Nigeria was previously listed partly because of concerns surrounding the Civilian Joint Task Force, a community-based force formed to defend communities against Boko Haram.
The Borno State Government provided the group with financial and material support, while the Nigerian military coordinated operations with it.
Reports alleged that children were recruited into support and security roles.
Nigeria was removed from the US list in 2019 but returned in 2020 and 2021 following reports that the CJTF had used two children, aged 15 and 17, at a checkpoint in a camp for internally displaced people.
The children were subsequently demobilised and referred for care. The United Nations also verified the release of thousands of children associated with the CJTF through the implementation of an action plan.
These facts complicate any claim that Nigeria has no responsibility whatsoever. A government cannot escape accountability because abuses are committed by a local militia rather than its regular armed forces.
Where it finances, equips, directs or coordinates operations with an armed group, it must ensure that such support does not facilitate the recruitment or use of children.
Nigeria must therefore do more than protest its inclusion on the blacklist. It must investigate allegations involving its forces and government-supported groups and prosecute offenders where the evidence warrants it.
It should prevent underage recruitment, strengthen oversight of local security partners and ensure that children associated with armed groups are rescued, rehabilitated and reintegrated into their communities.
But this obligation must not be stretched into collective culpability for the actions of terrorist organisations beyond the government’s control.
Boko Haram and ISWAP are not Nigerian government agencies. They operate in defiance of the state, attack civilians, seize territory and undermine public authority.
The government’s failure to eliminate them does not, in itself, prove that it recruits their child soldiers or condones their crimes. A state’s inability to prevent every violation in an insurgency is not the same as complicity in the violation.
Washington must therefore be precise about the basis of its findings. Does the evidence concern recruitment by Nigerian security forces, the use of children by government-supported militias, or failures to investigate and prosecute alleged violations?
What corrective steps does it expect, and how will compliance be assessed? These go to the heart of whether the designation is being applied fairly.
The relevant international legal framework is clear about the protection children deserve.
Article 38 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child requires states to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law applicable to children in armed conflict. Its Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict strengthens protections against recruitment and participation in hostilities.
Article 22 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child requires states to take all feasible measures to ensure that children do not take a direct part in hostilities and refrain from recruiting them.
The International Labour Organisation’s Convention No. 182 identifies forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict as one of the worst forms of child labour.
These obligations apply to Nigeria regardless of the identity of the perpetrators. They require prevention, protection and accountability.
But they do not mean that every crime committed by an insurgent group can automatically be attributed to the government. Responsibility must be established by examining the relevant legal obligations, the evidence of state involvement or failure, and the measures reasonably available to the authorities.
The American law itself recognises the importance of corrective action. Section 404 permits a presidential waiver where the US president determines that it is in the national interest and certifies that the government concerned is taking effective and continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers.
It also provides for the restoration of assistance when specified measures and safeguards have been implemented.
Significantly, the US Secretary of State issued a waiver for Nigeria on September 30, 2026, subsequently published in the Federal Register on October 20. This is a welcome development because it preserves room for continued security cooperation while acknowledging the need for corrective action.
But a waiver is not a substitute for sustained reform, nor should Nigeria regard it as an excuse to relax its child-protection obligations.
The wider security implications are substantial. Nigeria needs intelligence-sharing, military training, surveillance capabilities, equipment and other forms of international cooperation to confront an insurgency that continues to threaten communities and livelihoods. Disrupting essential assistance without carefully considering the consequences could weaken the fight against terrorist groups and expose more civilians, including children, to abuse.
This does not mean that the US should overlook proven violations to preserve a strategic partnership.
Rather, its response should distinguish between officials or armed groups responsible for recruitment, failures that the Nigerian government can remedy, and atrocities committed by terrorists outside its control.
Measures should encourage compliance and protect children without needlessly undermining legitimate counterterrorism operations.
Nigeria, meanwhile, must recognise that its sovereignty comes with obligations. It must protect children within its jurisdiction, prevent security partners from exploiting them, investigate abuses and demonstrate that those responsible will face the law.
It must also expand access to education, rehabilitation and psychosocial support for children affected by conflict.
The ultimate objective should be to end child recruitment, not to score diplomatic points or impose punishment for its own sake.
Nigeria cannot demand that the world ignore abuses committed by its security partners, just as Washington should not conflate the government with the terrorists it is fighting.
The country should be held accountable where the evidence establishes its responsibility. But it should not be unduly punished for the crimes of terrorists it neither commands nor controls.
The test of American policy should be whether it helps end the exploitation of children and strengthens their protection, not whether it weakens the struggle against those who abduct and turn them into weapons of war.
